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ntil recently, when lawyers thought of spurious 
litigation or solicitation of clients by members of the 
legal profession, they thought only of attorney 
disciplinary rules and possible sanctions by a 
grievance committee, or perhaps a tort action for 
malicious prosecution. And, of course, such conduct by a 
lawyer or her agent is prohibited by Rules 3.01, 7.02 and 7.03 
of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct. 1 
Such misconduct is not, however, merely a breach of 
professional etiquette or a violation of disciplinary rules. It is 
also a crime.2 
The History of Barratry in Texas 
Despite the fact that no one seems to know of a case in 
which a lawyer has been convicted of the offense of barratry,3 
Texas law established the crime as early as 1876. The earliest 
form merely proscribed institution of a suit by a person having 
no interest in the litigation if the suit was brought to distress 
or harass another.4 
In 1901 , the statute was amended to punish attorney 
solicitation of clients.5 It was already clear in 1901 that an 
attorney could be disbarred for barratry and that criminal 
prosectution for barratry was a sanction that could be sought 
in addition to professional discipline.6 The offense was 
extended in 1917 to solicitation by an attorney's agent. 7 
The 1925 Penal Code was replaced by the 1974 Penal 
Code, but the crime of barratry was preserved in somewhat 
simplified form .S Subsequent amendments have refined the 
specific intent requirement; have added a presumption to 
facilitate proof of that specific intent; and, most recently, 
have included under certain circumstances an internal en-
hancement of punishment to the third degree felony level 
for repeat offenders. 
The Modern Crime of Barratry 
In a sense, contingent fees, mass disasters, and the poten-
tial for huge damage awards to plaintiffs have brought the 
offense of barratry to life.9 With stakes so high, and com-
petition for clients so keen, accusations of improper solicita-
tion are inevitable. And since barratry, unlike most forms · 
of professional misconduct , is criminal, the sanctions are 
more serious and the procedures are often less familiar than 
for other ethical lapses. 
The "intent to distress or harass" required under prior law 
was replaced in the 197 4 version of barratry by "intent to 
obtain a benefit for himself or to harm another," a specific 
intent that has subsequently been reduced to "intent to ob-
tain an economic benefit for himself."IO "Economic benefit" 
is broadly defined to include "anything reasonably reg&rded 
as an economic gain or advantage,II 
A person acting with such intent violates the statute by 
committing any one of four prohibited acts. Two of these 
continue the original proscription against instituting an ac-
tion in which the person has no interesti2 or instituting an 
action "he knows is false."I3 The remaining two, and by 
far the more significant for lawyers practicing in a predatory 
and competitive environment, forbid solicitation of employ-
ment "to prosecute or defend a suit or to collect a claim,"I4 
or procuring another to do the actual soliciting.I5 
Intent to obtain an economic benefit from client solicita-
tion is unlikely to be difficult to prove unless the attorney 
is acting pro bono. The current version of the statute, never-
theless, includes a presumption of the specific intent "if the 
person accepts employment for a fee, accepts a fee, or ac-
cepts or agrees to accept money or any economic benefit."16 
It might be argued that this presumption effectively 
renders the solicitation form of barratry a strict liability 
crime. If an attorney, for example, "agrees to accept" an 
"economic benefit," the jury may be instructed that such 
evidence would permit an inference of his or her intent to 
obtain an economic benefit. Should the jury accept the in-
vitation contained in its instructions to employ the presump-
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tion, proof of the only culpability required for the crime 
would be satisfied by proof that the lawyer agreed to ac-
cept the benefit. 
While the Legislature may dispense directly with culpabili-
ty requirements for offenses, a due process question is raised 
by doing so for a sufficiently serious offense.I7 Use of the 
presumption in a given case may be found to violate due 
process because barratry may now be a felony offense in 
at least some circumstances, and the most serious kind of 
misdemeanor otherwise. IS 
A related concern in any case in which a presumption is 
employed is whether it unconstitutionally shifts the burden 
of persuasion to the accused. l9 Since the statutory presump-
tion of specific intent in the Texas barratry law may relieve 
the state of its burden of proof on an essential element of 
the offense, the presumption's constitutionality depends 
upon whether it is properly given to the jury.20 Texas law 
requires that presumptions in criminal cases be given in per-
missive form,2I and if that prescription is followed, it is 
unlikely that any due process challenge to the presumption 
would succeed.22 
"Solicitation" 
Personal solicitation of prospective clients is the evil 
targeted by the barratry statute. The Penal Code defines 
"solicit" to include communication "in person or by tele-
phone."23 However, not all personal solicitation is covered. 
Written solicitation is not included, and only solicitation 
of "a claimant or defendant" or "member of the claimant's 
or defendant's family" is prohibited.24 
The definition of solicitation also expressly excepts cer-
tain situations. If the communication has been requested, 
it is not within the purview of solicitation.25 Moreover, the 
term is inapplicable to communications by a family member, 
by an attorney with a pre-existing attorney-client relation-
ship, or with a "qualified nonprofit organization for the pur-
pose of educating laymen to recognize legal problems, to 
make intelligent selection of legal counsel, or to use available 
legal services."26 
The latter exceptions seem aimed at bar association refer-
ral services and community service agencies dealing with 
clients in need of legal advice.27 The exceptions for re-
quested contact and pre-existing clients are much more likely 
to provide defensive issues for the typical defendant, the 
practitioner ,28 
The Constitutionality of Prohibiting 
In-Person Solicitation 
The constitutionality of prohibiting solicitation remains 
unsettled despite the existence of several state and federal 
cases dealing with the issue.29 The principal constitutional 
attack on regulation of solicitation is grounded in the First 
Amendment. 
In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, the United States Su-
preme Court first recognized lawyer advertising as commer-
cial speech subject to First Amendment protection.30 While 
reasonable "time, place, and manner" regulations may be 
constitutionally imposed,31 Bates made clear that the state's 
interest in the regulation of commercial speech must justify 
any limitations.32 The Bates opinion did not, however, 
decide whether, or to what extent, a state might regulate 
in-person solicitation.33 That issue was specifically reserved 
with a comment in dicta that "[a]ctivity of that kind might 
well pose dangers of overreaching and misrepresentation not 
encountered in newspaper announcement advertising."34 
When the court did decide its first two solicitation cases, 
it distinguished the kinds of protection that might be in-
volved. In Ohra/ik v. Ohio State Bar Association,35 direct, 
in-person communication by a plaintiffs lawyer with a 
potential personal injury client was held to be subject to 
the First Amendment but not protected from disciplinary 
regulation.36 The state's interest in prohibiting in-person 
solicitation is stronger than that involved in print advertis-
ing because the potential for abuse is greater.37 Commer-
cial expression is, however, also subject to at least limited 
First Amendment protection.38 
In re Primus,39 a companion case to Ohralik, involved 
a different kind of solicitation, one that the Supreme Court 
held could not be prohibited. The ACLU attorney in Primus 
wrote, rather than personally spoke with, the potential client 
and offered to represent her in a civil rights matter.40 
Because of the nature of the claim, the court characterized 
the speech as political rather than commercial, and held it 
subject to greater protection.4I 
Because of the unique nature of the solicitation in Primus, 
the opinion was of limited value in defining the extent to 
which a state could prohibit impersonal (e .g., mail) solicita-
tion. That issue was later addressed in Shapero v. Kentucky 
Bar Association. 42 The lawyer in Shapero submitted to his 
state bar advertising commission for approval a copy of a 
letter he proposed to send advertising his legal services to 
persons who had had foreclosure actions initiated against 
them.43 The commission refused to approve the letter 
although it did not contend that the communication was 
false or misleading.44 
The Supreme Court ruled that the absolute prohibition 
on targeted mail solicitation violated the First Amendment 
absent a "particularized finding that the solicitation is false 
or misleading."45 Targeted mail solicitation, noted the 
court, is not merely "Ohralik in writing."46 The written 
solicitation is less subject to overreaching or undue influ-
ence;47 is more easily ignored by the recipient; is less in-
vasive of personal privacy; and is more "conducive to reflec-
tion and the exercise of choice ... than is personal solicita-
tion by an attorney."48 
The Shapero court conceded that even written solicita-
tions, particularly those sent to persons with specific legal 
service needs, are subject to abuses, but concluded that such 
abuses could be curbed by preapproval procedures rather 
than a complete ban.49 A rough synthesis of Shapero, 
Primus, and Ohralik suggests that while personal solicita-
tion for purely pecuniary gain might be banned, some kinds 
of personal solicitation, including those in writing, cannot 
be completely prohibited, although they might be reasonably 
regulated. 
The Supreme Court's opinions leave open questions about 
solicitation by telephone;SO personal solicitation for mixed 
political and pecuniary motives; and personal solicitation 
of a person, like a family member, other than the claimant 
or potential client. All of these forms of solicitation are pro-
hibited by the Texas barratry statute. 
Solicitation by telephone is subject to some of the same 
abuses feared from a face-to-face contact. Particularly, lay 
persons solicited by telephone may be unduly influenced in 
the selection of counsel and their privacy may be inappro-
priately invaded.SI On the other hand, consumers with 
public telephone numbers can scarcely avoid dealing with 
telephone solicitors. Their privacy is invaded much more 
often by non-lawyers than it is ever likely to be by attorneys 
seeking clients, although recent victims of tragedy may be 
more offended by legal solicitors. Moreover, consumers 
have learned to quickly and effectively terminate telephonic 
solicitations, something that is more difficult to do when 
confronted with an in-person solicitation. 
Decreased likelihood of undue influence also distinguishes 
in-person or telephonic solicitation of family members or 
friends of victims from solicitation of the victims themselves. 
When an attorney approaches an intermediary, he or she 
is less likely to produce substantial pressure on the poten-
tial client to choose the soliciting attorney, and the proffer 
of assistance is more easily rejected. 
Because the Texas barratry statute prohibits all personal 
and telephonic solicitations, including those directed at fami-
ly members, the offense may ultimately be held to infringe 
First Amendment commercial speech rights in at least some 
cases because, on balance, the consumer's need for infor-
mation about legal representation outweighs the dangers in-
herent in some kinds of solicitation. If an outright ban on 
all solicitation purely for pecuniary gain is not always per-
missible, reasonable regulation to ensure that the content 
of the solicitation is truthful and not misleading would 
almost always be unobjectionable.52 
Oral solicitation, because of its extemporaneous nature, 
is concededly more difficult to regulate than the written 
communication of Shapero.S3 A prerecorded telephonic 
message soliciting prospective clients, however, offers the 
same opportunity for regulation as the targeted mailings in 
Shapero.54 Regulation might go so far as to require record-
ing and archiving of telephonic or personal solicitations for 
post-hoc review in the event allegations of fraud or deceit 
are made.55 
In short, the sweeping prohibition of solicitation found 
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in the barratry statute may go too far to withstand constitu-
tional scrutiny in every prosecution.56 Personal solicitation 
in its most basic form has not, however, been viewed any 
more favorably by the Texas Supreme Court than by the 
United States Supreme Court. 
The Texas Courts' View of Solicitation 
Relatively few Texas decisions involve the criminal bar-
ratry statute directly.57 Fewer still have considered the con-
stitutionality or construction of the Jaw. 
The most significant Texas decision to date regarding the 
constitutionality of a solicitation prohibition (but not the 
criminal statute) is O'Quinn v. State Bar of Texas, a suit 
for injunctive relief from a disciplinary petition filed by the 
State Bar of Texas.58 The petition alleged that several non-
lawyers had recommended the employment of attorney John 
O'Quinn to persons who had not requested advice about 
representation. 59 O'Quinn appealed the denial of injunctive 
relief to the Texas Supreme Court on the grounds that the 
disciplinary rules "violate the Texas and United States con-
stitutional rights to commercial free speech, equal protec-
tion of the laws, and open access to the courts."60 
As expected, the arguments in O'Quinn pitted the need 
for information about legal services and protection of vic-
tims from "unscrupulous insurance adjusters" against "the 
potential for fraud and invasion of privacy."61 The court 
assumed that "some first amendment protection" exists for 
"in-person solicitation by a lawyer's runners," but also 
assumed that the state has a "strong and substantial interest 
in protecting the public" from the abuses of personal soli-
citation. 62 
After briefly noting that Shapero "involved targeted mail 
solicitation and does not implicate the concerns justifying 
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prohibitions against in-person solicitation of business," 
Justice Kilgarlin, writing for the majority, held that the 
disciplinary procedure instituted against O'Quinn did not 
violate the First Amendment. 63 
The court next turned to the state constitutional claim. 
Acknowledging that the Texas version of the First Amend-
ment may be broader than its federal counterpart,64 the 
court nevertheless held that Article I, Section 8, of the Texas 
Constitution is not violated by disciplining a lawyer for hir-
ing others to solicit business for pecuniary gain.65 Because 
of the legitimate state interest found in banning in-person 
solicitation of prospective clients, the court also rejected 
O'Quinn's equal protection claim. 66 
O'Quinn is the latest, but not the only case deciding the 
constitutionality of the ban on solicitation. In Barbee v. 
State, 67 the Court of Criminal Appeals also considered the 
issue, but without benefit of Bates and subsequent lawyer-
commercial speech cases. The defendant, Robert Barbee, 
was prosecuted under Article 430 of the 1925 Penal Code. 
He was alleged to have contacted a prospective wrongful 
death client and urged her to retain a Houston law firm to 
represent her in the matter. 
The Court of Criminal Appeals, in its decision on defen-
dant's motion for rehearing, found no constitutional viola-
tion in the conviction.68 The decision simply announced the 
result without discussion, citation to authority, or analy-
sis.69 Because Barbee was decided before Bates and for 
reasons not revealed in the opinion, it is of doubtful con-
tinuing validity. 70 
Punishment 
The offense of barratry is a Class A misdemeanor71 
unless punishment is enhanced by a prior conviction and 
special circumstances. 72 Solicitation or procuring another 
to solicit may be a third degree felony in such cases. 73 
Felony prosecution for barratry is very unlikely, however. 
Not only must the defendant have been previously convicted 
under subsection 38.12(a)(3) or (a)(4), the solicitation subsec-
tions, and be subsequently prosecuted under one of these 
subsections, he or she must also be shown to have solicited 
under very limited circumstances. 74 
These special circumstances include solicitation in a "hos-
pitaJ,75 funeral establishment,76 or public or private ceme-
tery or at the scene of an accident. "77 Other circumstances 
which enhance punishment upon subsequent conviction in-
clude solicitations by employees of the state, 78 a political 
subdivision, 79 or hospital or funeral establishment, 80 or 
solicitations by persons impersonating "a clergyman, public 
employee, or emergency assistance worker or volunteer."81 
The barratry statute provides that final conviction for 
felony barratry is a "serious crime" for purposes of the State 
Bar Rules.82 This subsection is an obvious legislative at-
tempt to include felony barratry as a basis for discipline for 
professional misconduct.83 The effort is, at best, redundant 
since the rules specifically include "engaging in conduct 
which constitutes barratry as defined by the law of this state" 
within the statutory grounds for discipline.84 Moreover, the 
provision within the barratry statute implies that only "felony 
barratry" is a serious crime for these purposes, while the 
State Bar Rules' inclusion of "conduct which constitutes bar-
ratry" encompasses acts punishable as a misdemeanor 
offense. 
It is also noteworthy that barratry is expressly included 
within the grounds for suspension or revocation of an at-
torney's license.85 The statute does not distinguish between 
"felony" barratry and "misdemeanor" barratry.86 An attor-
ney may be disbarred or suspended from practice in addi-
tion to, or in lieu of, any criminal sanction sought or 
obtained.87 
Conclusion 
In order for criminal prosecution for solicition of clients 
by attorneys to become more commonplace in Texas, hard 
questions of constitutionality and statutory construction 
must be addressed. Despite the venerable age of the offense, 
it is a "new" statute in terms of usage, and it has been made 
even "newer" by the post-Bates advertising cases. 
Lacking some unanticipated course change by the United 
States Supreme Court, the Texas ban on in-person solicita-
tion will withstand First Amendment scrutiny.88 Beyond 
Ohralik lies uncharted territory bounded only by the mail 
solicitation case, Shapero. Considerable ground lies between 
the two. And since the barratry offense absolutely prohibits 
rather than merely regulates solicitation, there may be less 
constitutional ground beneath the statute than had previous-
ly been supposed. 
Free speech is certainly not the only defensive issue within 
barratry. Equal protection and due process attacks remain, 
and more prosaic concepts of criminal responsibility may 
be brought to bear. No doubt all of these issues, and more, 
will be explored when that first Texas lawyer is successfully 
prosecuted for barratry. 
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